Flying Fox

In 2004 an incident occurred where a person fell from a flying fox ride, resulting in serious injury. The cause of incident was an operational failure in the attachment between the harness and the wire ropeway.
The fun involved in a flying fox as an amusement structure should not be at the risk of injury or death.
This Guidance Note informs owners, users, operators, designers, manufacturers and suppliers of flying fox equipment of the need to have in place minimum safety controls to prevent falls.

Risk assessment
If you own or operate a flying fox capable of carrying riders, you must assess the risk of a fall occurring as a result of equipment failure or through incorrect use of equipment. This assessment should take into account use, configuration, supervision, cleaning and maintenance, and inspection and repair of the equipment.

A fall from a flying fox may occur as a result of:
* a failure of the attachment method between the harness and the flying fox;
* the rider coming out of the harness when the person turns upside down, whether that is planned or unplanned;
* a failure to apply equipment correctly or other equipment failure.

To assist in identifying these and other risks, you should refer to Australian Standards AS 3533 Amusement Rides and Devices, AS 1891 Industrial Fall Arrest Systems and Devices, and other documents listed in "Further Information". You will then need to then implement safety solutions necessary to control the risks in your individual situation.

Performance requirements

WorkSafe expects the following performance requirements to be fulfilled:
1. A back-up system exists by way of a second connection between the travelling block ("pulley") and the harness. As a minimum the back-up system must apply from the point where the person is attached to the ride via their harness, through to the point where the flying fox is attached to the travelling block on the wire ropeway.
2. A method is in use that ensures that the harness remains securely attached to the rider in the event that the person is inverted, regardless of body types and sizes.

Flying fox operators should consult with manufacturers and installers to ensure that equipment is used within its intended design and operating parameters.

Achieving the performance requirements -- a back-up system

A second connection, by way of a back-up system between the travelling block and the harness, must be installed to prevent a fall in the event that the connection provided by the primary system fails. See Figure 1.

The purpose of such an arrangement is to improve the reliability of the human factor when attaching the person to the flying fox, in order to minimise the likelihood of a fall.

1. For flying foxes where a harness and lanyard arrangement is relied on to bear all or most of the person's weight: acceptable attachment arrangements in the back-up system include:
1. a detachable back-up lanyard. This configuration allows for attachment points on the person's harness and to a single travelling block by means of a lanyard with a carabiner at either end.
2. a "permanent" back-up lanyard. This configuration allows for a fixed attachment point of the lanyard to the person's harness. If the lanyard is made of a loop of webbing material, it can be attached to the harness using a Choke Knot. Attachment to the travelling block is by means of a carabiner.
3. the harness has a single purpose-built attachment point that is an integral part of the harness, and both lanyards are securely attached to that point by separate independent carabiners.
4. the harness has two purpose-built attachment points that are integral to the harness, and one lanyard is securely attached to each point. Attachment is by separate independent carabiners.
All these arrangements have two connections between the harness and the travelling block itself. Some of the arrangements locate to a single point on the harness and/or the travelling block. It is good practice to ensure that arrangements locate to separate permanent purpose-engineered points on the harness and the travelling block.
2. For flying foxes that rely on carriers such as bucket seats, inverted-T seats, metal pole-and-seat or similar elements to carry all of the person's weight: acceptable attachment arrangements in the back-up system include:
i. A separate secure system of attachment that provides connection of the person to the travelling block, or to a permanent engineered attachment point on the carrier.

Compliance with the Australian Standards is required including for braking and recoil performance (see Further information below).

Figure 1 below: illustrates a flying fox harness and lanyards arrangement that achieves the performance requirements by using an arrangement where both the primary lanyard of support, and the back-up lanyard, attaches to a single point on the harness. The illustration is indicative and other arrangements are acceptable where they fulfil the performance requirements given above.

Elements omitted from the Figure for clarity include a method for ensuring shoulder straps stay located; appropriate lanyard length to ensure patron is not entangled in travelling block or exposed to severe shock loads; strops provided if necessary as hand gripping points (not patron support points); return rope provided if necessary for returning the flying fox to the top of the wire ropeway. The sheath wrap/sock is illustrated to show one method of preventing entanglement, where a risk assessment finds that a risk of entanglement exists.

Figure 1: a flying fox harness and lanyards arrangement where both the primary lanyard of support, and the back-up lanyard attach to a single point on the harness.
Figure 1: a flying fox harness and lanyards arrangement where both the primary lanyard of support, and the back-up lanyard attach to a single point on the harness.

Achieving the performance requirements -- a safe harness system

The risk assessment should identify where inversion does or may occur, including where being inverted is a planned part of the activity, where the design of the ropeway results in inversion (e.g. as part of recoil or braking), or where horseplay cannot be ruled out.

The harness must:

1. be suitable as a risk control for risks arising from planned or unplanned inversion, and
2. be suitable for the intended use, as defined by the manufacturer, and
3. must be suitable for the person; e.g. a small-size harness for a child.

Where inversion does not occur, examples of acceptable harnesses include a sit harness without chest harness; a sit harness with chest harness; a full body harness.

Where the flying fox causes or allows a person to travel in a horizontal or inverted position, a harness that prevents falling from this position must be used. Examples include a full body harness; a sit harness with chest harness; or a sit harness without chest harness where it can be clearly demonstrated from manufacturer's test results and operator compliance with manufacturer's instructions that the harness prevents falls when used in the intended flying fox application.

Wherever inversion is a planned part of the amusement, or a sit harness cannot be correctly fitted or may not prevent a fall, harnesses such as a full body harness or a sit harness with chest harness shall be used.

The risk assessment should identify the consequences of the back-up system coming into operation. For example, crush injuries may occur if the person's chest becomes the point at which most or all of the person's weight is borne (eg if a back-up located at the chest comes in to operation with associated shock load). Where such risks exist, the back-up arrangement must be redesigned to eliminate or minimise them.

Good practice is that a chest harness does not bear any of the person's weight under normal operation.

Refer to AS 3533 for details on Person Attachment Systems, and to AS/NZS 1891.1 for details of Person Attachment System Performance Requirements.

Other safety measures

Travelling block ("pulley")
The travelling block must be designed and installed so a fall will not occur if it fails. The travelling block must have a method such as a guard that prevents a fall should a sheave or pin fail. The trolley must have a minimum of two sheaves. As a minimum the travelling block must comply with the requirements of AS 3533 for breaking strength and working load.

The lanyard of the primary system of attachment should be connected to a hole that is located at a point between the axles of the outermost sheaves within the travelling block. Unless the manufacturer approves the use of one hole as suitable for attaching more than one carabiner, the back-up system should be connected to a separate hole or more than one separate hole, depending on weight distribution requirements.

Lanyards
Lanyards must be purpose designed, type load tested, and capacity rated. The minimum requirement is compliance with AS 1891.1.

Single lanyards should have eyes fabricated into each end of the lanyard.

In lanyard arrangements for primary and back-up systems, the risk assessment may identify a risk of the person becoming entangled in the two lanyards. On flying foxes where this risk does or may exist, methods to prevent entanglement should be used, for example a sheath, bag, sock or zipped wrapper. Colour coding, or different sizes or types of lanyard construction, can be used to identify the lanyards of the primary and back-up systems.

A risk of entrapment may exist if the lanyards are the same length. Under no circumstances should two equal load-bearing lanyards be used if there is any possibility of inserting a body part between them. The lanyard of the back-up system should be longer. Good practice is that the back-up lanyard should not bear any load during normal use when compared to the lanyard of the primary system.

Harness attachment loops
The attachment loop on the harness must be durable, of known sufficient load-bearing capacity, integral to the harness and permanent. Its purpose should be obvious and it should not be confused with other parts of the harness. Manufacturer's advice should be followed about connecting equipment to the loop, eg number of and placement of connections. The arrangement should be easily inspected and allow for regular maintenance of the loop.

Carabiners, snap hooks and maillons
All carabiners, snap hooks and maillons should be of the lockable type and used within the parameters specified by the manufacturer. Operators should also ensure that the manufacturer's inspection & maintenance requirements are met. Operators must also be trained and competent to carry out attachment work.

Some attachment equipment is susceptible to rollout in some circumstances. Rollout results in loss of attachment and a person falling. Flying fox operators should be aware of this potential and should refer to clause 4.2.4 of AS 1891,4: 2000 for more detail. Flying fox operators when selecting appropriate attachment devices must ensure that the potential for rollout is identified as a hazard when undertaking their risk assessment and make sure that appropriate controls are in place to prevent this. Part of the risk assessment would be to confirm that twist-lock carabiners were not being used.

The risk assessment may identify other consequences of operator error and suitable methods should be put in place to control the risk. For example, the possibility that an operator could place both lanyards into one carabiner and then place the second carabiner into the harness, can be fatal under some circumstances..

Supervision of harness fitting and use
The harnesses fit-out should be checked by a person who is trained in the correct use and fitting of the harnesses and associated support equipment. Criteria for correct fit are known and checked; for example that the sit harness cannot slide over the person's hips.

The supervisor at the launch platform upon securing the person to the flying fox wire ropeway checks all fittings to ensure that the harness has been fitted correctly and all attachments are correctly made and will not interfere with each other. The supervisor ensures that all equipment has been correctly configured including the harness and that all attachments are connected via the correct lanyards and carabiners etc.

Safety rules should be established, communicated and enforced about not loosening the harness, not opening carabiners, attachments etc, and that horseplay is not permitted.

Equipment maintenance
Procedures should be in place for cleaning, storing, discarding and replacing flying fox components, including harnesses, carabiners, travelling blocks and lanyards. Criteria for discarding and replacing flying fox components including harnesses, carabiners, travelling blocks and lanyards are planned ahead of time. The accept/reject criteria for equipment are known to all supervisors and maintenance staff of the flying fox operation.

Training, competency, and safe operating procedures
The above requirements should be included in operating procedures. Methods should be in place that ensure all people involved in the safe operation of the flying fox are trained, posses the required skills and knowledge, are competent, and have adequate supervision.

Legal responsibilities
The Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 requires employers and self-employed persons to ensure that a work environment is, so far as is reasonably practicable, safe and without risks to health of employees and other people. This duty includes ensuring safety in provision and maintenance of plant and systems of work.
(http://images.google.co.id/imgres?imgurl=http://www.worksafe.vic.gov.au/wps/wcm/resources/image/4689bfe497c89a29/1.gif&imgrefurl=http://www.worksafe.vic.gov.au/wps/wcm/connect/WorkSafe/Home/Forms%2Band%2BPublications/Guidance%2BNotes/import_Flying%2BFox%2BAttachment%2B--%2BPreventing%2BFalls&usg=__2rcdfbDw0vt4r9aO4j44pEy6Bu8=&h=703&w=458&sz=31&hl=id&start=9&um=1&tbnid=hIFg7v0TXxNHbM:&tbnh=140&tbnw=91&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dflying%2Bfox%26hl%3Did%26sa%3DN%26um%3D1)